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Maki et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
African Regional &
Sub-Regional Systems
Collective Rights but No
Independence for Southern
Cameroons
On May 27, 2009, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
declared Southern Cameroonians “a people.” Nearly eight months later, the decision remains a topic of vigorous public
debate in Cameroon. The recognition of
Southern Cameroonians as a people culminated a six-year legal battle initiated by a
complaint filed on behalf of the people of
Southern Cameroons against the Republic
of Cameroon. The complainants asserted
that the Republic of Cameroon is illegally
occupying the Southern Cameroons in violation of Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For
the Southern Cameroonian independence
movement, this decision represents only
partial success. As a recognized people,
Southern Cameroonians can now assert
collective rights under the African Charter.
However, the Commission stopped short
of the complainants’ ultimate goal, instead
upholding a high threshold for a people to
be able to exercise the right to self-determination through secession where doing
so challenges the territorial integrity of a
state.
As the Commission explained, “a people” is a group that shares “a common
historical tradition, a racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity,
religious and ideological affinities, territorial connection, and a common economic
life.” The people of Southern Cameroons
contend that their history of British colonial occupation differentiates them from
the majority population of the Republic of
Cameroon and defines their present-day
identity. While Southern Cameroonians
speak English and follow the common law
system, most people of the Republic of
Cameroon speak French and ascribe to the
civil law system.
In their initial filing, the complainants
asserted that recognition of a group as
“a people” under the Charter entitles the

group to collective rights. They contended
that all peoples have a right to secession by
means of self-determination under Article
20(1) of the Charter, which states:
All peoples shall have the right
to existence. They shall have the
unquestionable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine
their political status, and shall pursue
their economic and social development according to the policy they
have freely chosen.
However, according to the Commission, the right to self-determination is not
absolute. Meeting the requirements to be
recognized as a people “cannot be used
as the only determinant factor to accord
or deny the enjoyment or protection of
peoples’ rights.”
To determine whether the African Charter permits Southern Cameroons to secede
from the Republic of Cameroon, the Commission relied on precedent established
in Katangese Peoples Congress v. Zaire,
which it decided in 1995. In Katangese
Peoples Congress, a liberation movement
from the Katanga region of what was then
Zaire filed a claim for independence based
on Article 20(1) of the Charter. The Commission held that the Charter only recognizes a legal basis for self-determination in
circumstances of either massive violations
of human rights or prohibition of a peoples’
participation in public affairs. Applying the
test from Katangese Peoples Congress to
the case of Southern Cameroons, the Commission found that, even though multiple
individual rights of Southern Cameroonians were violated, the Republic of Cameroon neither committed massive human
rights violations nor completely barred
Southern Cameroonians from participating
in governance and public affairs.
Consequently, the Commission’s recognition of Southern Cameroonians as a
people likely provides few, if any, additional rights or privileges to the people of
the Southern Cameroons. However, the
Commission’s recognition of the Southern
Cameroonians as a people may strengthen
their case for greater political autonomy
within the Republic of Cameroon.
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African Court’s First Judgment
Showcases Jurisdictional Limits
In its historic first judgment, rendered
on December 15, 2009, judges of the
African Court of Human and Peoples’
Rights voted unanimously to dismiss a case
for lack of jurisdiction. The complainant,
Michelot Yogogombaye, had requested that
the Court suspend ongoing proceedings
initiated by Senegal against former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré, who has lived
in exile in Senegal since being deposed in
1990. Habré is alleged to be responsible for
200,000 cases of torture and 40,000 politically motivated murders committed during
his presidency. The ruling highlights an
immense obstacle in the way of the Court’s
jurisdiction over complaints filed by individuals or NGOs against an African state:
the respondent state must have first given
its consent.
The complaint alleged that the case
against Habré is politically motivated, citing the 2008 amendment of the Senegalese Constitution that permits retroactive
application of Senegalese criminal law,
the result of international pressure to prosecute Habré. Yogogombaye claimed the
amendment violates both the Senegalese
Constitution and Article 7(2) of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
requiring that “no penalty may be inflicted
for an offence for which no provision was
made at the time it was committed.”
In response, Senegal moved to dismiss Yogogombaye’s complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. Senegal argued that before
individuals can file complaints before the
Court, “the respondent State must first
have recognized the jurisdiction of the
Court to receive such applications in accordance with Article 34(6) of the Protocol
establishing the Court.”
Yogogombaye contended that, because
Senegal is a member of the African Union,
which promulgated the Protocol, Senegal
has de facto “made the declaration prescribed in Article 34(6) accepting the competence of the Court to receive applications
submitted by individuals.”
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In finding for Senegal, the Court
affirmed that Article 34(6) makes direct
access to the Court contingent on a prior
“special declaration” by the respondent
state authorizing cases to be brought
against it by individuals. Because Senegal
has made no such declaration, the Court
dismissed Yogogombaye’s complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
At present, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples Rights provides the
only other avenue available to individuals
and NGOs intent on filing a claim before
the Court against a state that has not
made a special declaration. Establishing
a relationship similar to that of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Article 5 of the Protocol grants the
Commission authority to refer cases to the
Court. It is as yet unclear what criteria the
Commission will use to determine whether
to refer a case to the Court.
In light of the horrific crimes carried out under Habré’s regime, the Court’s
dismissal of Yogogombaye’s complaint
may seem comforting. However, the Court
could just as easily dismiss a case in which
the complainant is a victim of state abuses.
What then will convince African states to
offer their own victims the possibility of
filing a direct complaint before the Court?
As is evidenced by the fact that Burkina
Faso and Mali are the only two states that
have filed the special declaration, African
states are not eager to increase their exposure to potential complaints. Consequently,
Yogogombaye lays bare one great obstacle
to accessing the new Court. For the Court
to fulfill its objective of “promotion and
protection of Human and Peoples’ Rights,”
citizens and non-state actors must advocate
for Article 34(6) declarations from their
governments.

Compliance with Existing
Mandate Must Come before War
Crimes Trials at African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights
“Extending the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
to cover international crimes would undermine justice and accountability on the
continent,” asserted a coalition of eight
prominent international human rights
groups in an expert opinion published
December 17, 2009. The statement came

in response to a February 2009 decision
made by the Assembly of the African
Union (AU) during its 12th Ordinary Session. The decision pertained to a perceived
abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction, a repeated topic of concern within the
Assembly.
On this occasion, the Assembly’s objection pertained to France’s November 2008
arrest of Rose Kabuye, the Chief of Protocol to the President of Rwanda and former
officer in the Rwandan Patriotic Front, for
her alleged involvement in the assassination of former Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana. The Assembly criticized the
arrest and formally requested the AU Commission “to examine the implications of
the Court being empowered to try international crimes such as genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.”
However, as the authors of the expert
opinion assert, any extension of the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Court must be
“compatible with the United Nations Charter and, by implication, the Rome Statute
of the ICC.” Meeting this standard could
be difficult.
In addition to needing increased financial and diplomatic resources to support
the expertise needed for an expanded jurisdiction, the Court would also require AU
Member States to strengthen norms of
compliance and cooperation. The current
low rate of compliance with decisions of
the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights suggests that adherence to
decisions by the Court in contentious criminal cases would not be easily achieved.
Consequently, contrary to AU Member
States’ obligation under Article 4 of the AU
Constitutive Act to fight impunity, enlarging the jurisdiction of the Court could even
widen the impunity gap for individuals
responsible for egregious crimes.
Expanding the jurisdiction of the Court
is not the only means of bolstering the
credibility of the African regional human
rights system. Improving compliance and
cooperation within the current legal framework could also minimize the frequency
with which foreign courts invoke universal jurisdiction over African nationals.
Additionally, as the largest regional group
within the Assembly of States Parties to
the Rome Statute of the ICC, AU Member
States could enhance their engagement
and thereby exert greater influence within
the ICC. Therefore, in anticipation of the
61

Commission’s review of the Court’s jurisdiction, AU Member States must prioritize
compliance with the existing mandate of
the Court.
Andrew W. Maki, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the
African regional and sub-regional courts
for the Human Rights Brief.

European Court of
Human Rights
Ethnicity Requirements for
Candidates: Human Rights
Violation or Peace Promotion?
Provisions of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian constitution restricting the ability
to run for the Presidency or the House of
Peoples to the three “constituent peoples,”
Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats, violates the
European Convention on Human Rights,
the European Court of Human Rights held
on December 22, 2009. In Sedjić and Finci
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, two otherwise
qualified Bosnian and Herzegovinian citizens, one Jewish and the other Roma, were
deemed ineligible to run for the Presidency
and the House of Peoples, solely because
of their ethnicity. The Court determined
that the contested constitutional provisions
violate several Convention provisions,
including Article 14, the prohibition of
discrimination, together with Protocol No.
1 Article 3, the right to free elections, and
Protocol No. 12 Article 1, the general prohibition of discrimination.
Annexed to the 1995 Dayton Peace
Accords, which ended the ethnic conflict,
the Bosnian and Herzegovinian constitution distinguishes between two categories of citizens: “constituent peoples” and
“others.” The Constitution requires that
the House of Peoples be composed of 15
members, equally divided among each of
the three constituent groups. One member
of each group comprises the three-member
rotating Presidency. Individuals who do not
identify themselves as Bosniacs, Croats, or
Serbs, like the applicants in this case, are
forbidden from running for these offices.
At the time of the Constitution’s enactment, mandating equal representation of
the warring groups in the Presidency and
the upper parliamentary house promoted
the peace-keeping aims of the Dayton
Peace Accords. The Court reasoned, however, that because the extreme ethnic
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tension between these three groups has
considerably stabilized in recent years,
such limitations are no longer necessary.
While acknowledging that a complete
abandonment of the power-sharing mechanisms may not be suitable at this time, the
Court proposed that Bosnia and Herzegovina could replace the discriminatory
provisions with “mechanisms of powersharing which do not automatically lead
to the total exclusion of representatives
of the other communities.” For example,
the lower parliamentary house, the House
of Representatives, ensures representation
of both of the state’s political territories,
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Republika Srpska. The Constitution requires that two-thirds of the House
of Representatives be selected from the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
while the other third be chosen from the
Republika Srpska, regardless of ethnicity.
Mandating regional representation rather
than an ethnic quota may preserve peace
between the entities without excluding
non-constituent groups.
The effect of the Court’s decision
remains to be seen. Debates on constitutional reform began in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, but have yielded no
significant changes thus far. Most recently,
in October 2009, U.S.-EU brokered talks
in Butmir failed to produce meaningful
agreement, casting uncertainty on the ruling’s ability to instigate real change. Elections for the Presidency and House of
Peoples will next be held in October 2010.

Swiss Ban on Minarets Heads to
European Court
On December 16, 2009, Hafid Ouardiri, an Algerian-born Muslim living in
Switzerland and former spokesman for the
Geneva Mosque, filed a complaint with
the Court challenging Switzerland’s recent
constitutional amendment barring the construction of new mosque minarets. The ban,
approved in a November 2009 referendum
by 57.5 percent of the Swiss population
and 22 of the state’s 26 cantons, will add a
new Article 72(3) to the Swiss constitution,
plainly stating, “The construction of minarets is prohibited.” Ouardiri argues that the
amendment violates Convention Article 9,
the freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion; Article 13, the right to an effective
remedy; and Article 14, the prohibition of
discrimination.

The Swiss People’s Party, a conservative political party previously criticized
for its racist campaigns, initially proposed
the amendment with several other small
groups in April 2007. Although recognizing that the Swiss constitution guarantees
the freedom of religion, the website for
the Federal Popular Initiative Against the
Construction of Minarets argues that “the
minaret is the symbol of a political-religious claim that . . . places religion above
the State.” Because minarets represent
respecting religion more than the laws of
the state, these structures, according to the
site, represent an “attempt . . . to impose
a legal system based on sharia in Switzerland,” thus threatening the supremacy of
the Swiss federal government.
The Swiss government opposed the
initiative and urged citizens to reject it, yet
stated that it will not overturn the amendment. Micheline Calmy-Rey, the Federal
Councilor of the Swiss Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs admitted in an interview with Le Monde that, although “the
[Swiss] government and political parties
were surprised by the result” of the referendum, a government reversal is unlikely. To
dismiss the referendum would be “to suppress participative democracy,” continues
Calmy-Rey.
The Swiss government adamantly
asserts that the minaret ban neither reflects
anti-Islam sentiment nor impacts Muslims’
ability to practice their religion; however,
the referendum fueled fears of an increasingly hostile environment for Switzerland’s
400,000 Muslims. Farhad Afshar, leader
of the Coordination of Islamic Organizations in Switzerland, revealed to The New
York Times that the “[m]ost painful for
[Muslims] is not the minaret ban, but the
symbol sent by this vote. Muslims do not
feel accepted as a religious community.”
If accepted by the Court, this case
would pose an interesting scenario. The
Swiss government, which opposed the initiative, would serve as the party defending
the vote. According to Ouardiri’s attorney
Pierre de Preux, “We will have both the
plaintiff Hafid Ouardiri and the defendant, Switzerland, saying the same thing.
The court is still free to decide whatever
it wants, but it sure is going to help the
request.”
The Court has yet to determine whether
to admit the case. To present a case
before the Court, the applicant must have
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exhausted all other available domestic judicial remedies; however, the Swiss Federal
Tribunal, Switzerland’s highest court, lacks
jurisdiction over cases contesting referenda. Even if the Court accepts the application for a hearing, a decision is unlikely for
several years.

Human Trafficking Violates
Article 4
In a historic judgment, the Court held
that human trafficking constitutes a violation of Article 4 of the Convention, the
prohibition of slavery and forced labor.
In its January 7, 2010 ruling in Rantsev v.
Cyprus and Russia, the Court elaborated
on the positive obligations of all states
to combat human trafficking by adopting “appropriate” legal and administrative
frameworks, taking preventative measures,
and providing adequate investigations of
known cases of trafficking.
The case centered on Oxana Rantseva,
a Russian national, who entered Cyprus on
an artiste visa, a visa commonly associated with commercial sexual exploitation.
After she ran away from the cabaret where
she worked, Rantseva’s employer brought
her to the police to have her deported. Following a brief detainment, police decided
against deportation and released Rantseva
back to her employer. Hours later, Rantseva was found dead below the balcony
of another employee’s apartment, a bed
sheet tied to the railing above her. Never
investigating the possibility that she was a
human trafficking victim, perhaps trying
to escape, the Cypriot government closed
the case, declaring that the “strange circumstances” of Rantseva’s death suggested
an accident. Despite Russia’s request for
further investigation, Cyprus refused to
reopen the case.
Although Cyprus admitted to violating
several Convention articles, the Court proceeded to examine the case because of the
serious nature of the allegations of trafficking, ultimately finding violations of Article
2, the right to life; Article 4, the prohibition
of slavery and forced labor; and Article 5,
the right to liberty and security. While not
specifically equating human trafficking
with slavery, the Court determined that it
clearly fell within the scope of Article 4,
because human trafficking “by its very
nature and aim of exploitation, is based on
the exercise of powers attaching to the right
of ownership.” States therefore have a posi-
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tive duty to prevent trafficking and protect
its victims. The Court found Cyprus violated Article 4 by failing to take proactive measures to prevent and investigate
the suspected trafficking. Russia violated
Article 4 as well by failing to investigate
Rantseva’s recruitment by traffickers.
Russian and Cypriot law criminalizes
human trafficking, yet both states continue
to have significant problems. The 2008
U.S. Department of State Trafficking in
Persons Report categorizes Russia and
Cyprus as Tier 2 Watch List states. Country
rankings, which range from Tier 1 to Tier 3,
are based on the state’s status as a source,
destination, or transit country and the government’s initiative and resources available
to combat trafficking and accommodate
victims. Russia, deemed a source, destination, and transit state, “has yet to provide
comprehensive victim assistance,” according to the report. Although Cyprus, primarily a destination state, has taken some
legislative initiative against trafficking, its
failure to abolish the artiste visa, despite
knowledge that the “the word ‘artiste’ . . .
has become synonymous with ‘prostitute,’”
has kept the country on the Watch List.
The Council of Europe has taken
measures to combat trafficking amongst
Member States, including adopting the
Convention on Action against Trafficking of Human Beings. Legally binding on
States Parties, the Anti-Trafficking Convention seeks to aid victims and establishes
a monitoring mechanism to report the
progress of domestic implementation and
make specific policy recommendations
to States Parties not in compliance. The
Court’s ruling in Rantsev should render the
Anti-Trafficking Convention more effective. Holding that the European Convention bans human trafficking, the rulings
now require all member states, including
those that have failed to sign or ratify the
Anti-Trafficking Convention, to prevent
trafficking and protect victims.
Whitney Hayes, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the
European Court of Human Rights for the
Human Rights Brief.

Inter-American System
IACtHR Reforms Rules of
Procedure
On November 24, 2009, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) presented its new rules of procedure, describing the reform process as “the
product of constructive, participatory, and
transparent communication with the different actors and users of the Inter-American
System.” The Court received suggestions
from the Inter-American Commission,
several Member States, and various civil
society organizations. The reform reflects
a noteworthy effort to ensure procedural
equality among parties, refocuses the
Commission as a neutral organ within the
Inter-American system, and recalibrates
Court proceedings to be more efficient.
The new rules seek to ensure that
the Commission acts as a neutral organ
intended to guarantee procedural equality
among parties in proceedings before the
Court. Prior to the reform, the Commission
initiated proceedings before the Court by
submitting a limited application that only
identified claims and parties to the case,
set forth facts that gave rise to an alleged
violation of the American Convention of
Human Rights or the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
listed evidence provided by the parties,
and stated its conclusions. Additionally, the
Commission was required to provide the
Court with a copy of its Article 50 report.
Such a report is prepared in compliance
with Article 50 of the Convention and
issued to a state containing conclusions,
proposals, and recommendations that if
complied with, would remedy alleged violations of the Convention or the Declaration and would obviate any need for the
Commission to initiate proceeding before
the Court. In addition, the Commission
was previously not required to forward to
the Court the entire case file, including a
copy of the State’s response to the Article
50 report. In other words, the Commission’s report materials sent to the Court
did not include actions the state may have
taken to remedy alleged violation of the
Convention or Declaration.
Under the new rules, the Commission
must submit a merits report that includes
all the information previously required plus
its observations regarding the state’s answer
to the Article 50 report recommendations
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and its reasons for submitting the case to
the Court. The Commission’s report to the
Court will now contain all documents in
the case file, including all communications
following the issue of the Article 50 report.
The new rules therefore ensure the Commission’s neutrality by requiring it to send
all relevant information regarding the case,
without selecting documents or information that could be perceived as favoring one
party over the other.
Similarly, the reform seeks to curtail the
Commission’s function as an advocate for
either party in the litigation. Previously,
the Commission would offer witnesses
and declarations which supported the victim’s claim, thereby assuming the role of
the victim’s advocate. Now, the Commission will not offer witnesses to support a
victim’s claim, and can only offer expert
witnesses in limited circumstances. This
change exemplifies the reform’s objective
of defining the Commission as an organ
that promotes respect for human rights in
general, but does not act as a legal representative to specific alleged victims.
The new rules also reinforce the Commission’s neutral role before the Court by
creating a mechanism that provides victims with neutral representation. Under the
previous rules of procedure, the Commission represented those victims who lacked
legal representation. Article 37 now allows
the Court to appoint an “Inter-American
Defender” to act as a legal representative
for the victim throughout the proceedings. Through this reform, victims will be
guaranteed an attorney to represent them
before the Court; economic considerations
will no longer impede access to legal
representation; and the Commission will
be prevented from taking the conflicting
roles of a victim’s legal representative and
a neutral organ.
The new rules aim to make Court proceedings more efficient. For instance,
Articles 28, 44, and 51(11) authorize the
Court to use new technologies to expedite
proceedings and facilitate communication
between the Court, the Commission, the
state, and the victims. Moreover, the new
rules permit the Court to accept electronic briefs from all parties and receive
statements through electronic audio-visual
means.
Finally, Article 19 now prohibits judges
from considering and deliberating in cases
against states of which they are nationals,
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limiting possible bias by the Court. Article
25 now authorizes the representatives of
alleged victims who do not agree on one
“common intervener” in a case, to appoint
up to three common interveners. A common intervener is the only person authorized to present pleadings, motions, and
evidence during the proceedings; in cases
with multiple victims, agreeing on a single
individual has proved difficult. In sum,
these procedural reforms appear to reflect
the different interests and concerns of parties before the Court and will hopefully
enhance procedural efficiency.

the right to freedom of expression is not
absolute. Article 13(2) of the Convention
provides that exercising the right may be
subject to subsequent liability when limitations to the right are “expressly established
by law” (the legality requirement) and only
restrict the right to “the extent necessary to
ensure: (1) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or (2) the protection of
national security [and] public order,” (the
necessary and proportional requirements).
Venezuela argued that the limitations to
freedom of expression created in Section
505 were consistent with Article 13.2; the
IACtHR found otherwise.

IACtHR Denounces Venezuela’s
Criminalization of Speech against
the Government

The Court noted that Section 505 was
too vague and ambiguous to meet the
legality requirement of Article 13.2. Specifically, the statute did not strictly prescribe the elements constituting an injury
to the honor of the armed forces, nor
did it specify the mens rea requirement.
Moreover, the IACtHR held that while the
state’s interest in protecting the honor of
the armed forces was a legitimate aim that
could justify restricting freedom of expression, the criminal sanctions prescribed
in Section 505 were excessively vague
and ambiguous, and therefore incompatible
with the Amercian Convention. Finally,
the IACtHR found that the limitation on
speech was disproportional, balancing the
government’s interest in protecting the
honor of the military with Usón’s right to
comment on a matter of public importance.
In a carefully parsed-out conclusion, the
IACtHR criticized the state, holding that
it gave “greater and automatic protection
to the honor and reputation [of the armed
forces] without considering the heightened
protection accorded to freedom of expression within a democratic society.”

On November 20, 2009, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found Venezuela violated Francisco Usón Ramírez’s
right to freedom of expression when it
sentenced him to prison under a statute
that criminalizes statements dishonoring
the Venezuelan military. American University Washington College of Law’s Impact
Litigation Project represented Usón before
the Court.
In November 2004, a Venezuelan military tribunal convicted Usón for “dishonoring and disrespecting the [armed] forces of
Venezuela,” as articulated in Section 505 of
the penal code, after Usón spoke on television about an incident in which prison
guards at a military fort were alleged
to have burned an inmate with a flamethrower. Usón suggested that, if the allegations were true, the assault was probably
premeditated by members of the military.
The military judge held that Usón’s declarations offended the honor of Venezuela’s
armed forces and sentenced him to five and
a half years in prison. Usón served three
and a half years and was conditionally
released on parole.
The IACtHR declared that section 505
of the Venezuelan penal code, which criminalizes speech that dishonors the Venezuelan armed forces, violates Article 13,
freedom of thought and expression, of
the Convention. The Court explained that

The Court also declared that Venezuela violated Usón’s rights under Article
8 (right to fair trial) and Article 25 (right
to judicial protection) of the Convention
because Usón was tried in a military court,
although he was not an active military
officer nor had he committed a crime of
military nature. The Court ordered the state
to annul Usón’s trial and clear his criminal
record, and also ordered reparations.
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The Usón case is best understood within
Inter-American jurisprudence related to
desacato or contempt laws, which criminalize speech against the government or
public officials. For example, in Kimel
v. Argentina the IACtHR found that the
state’s criminal definition of defamation
could not be extended to protect the government’s honor. Also, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has stated
that desacato laws are inconsistent with
democracy because they provide greater
protection to public officials than to private citizens and in democratic societies
the government should be subject to public
scrutiny.
Although the IACtHR found that Venezuela violated Usón’s right to freedom
of expression, the decision could have
gone further by spelling out two important points. First, the Court could have
rejected the notion that the government
has a permissible interest in protecting the
honor and reputation of an institution like
the armed forces. Instead, the Court found
that Venezuela’s interest in protecting the
military’s honor was a legitimate aim that
may justify imposing subsequent liability
on freedom of expression. This finding is
problematic because an abusive state could
promulgate contempt laws and limit dissent or critical speech with the justification
that these laws aim to protect government
honor.
Second, the Court could have ruled that
the state may never use its criminal law to
protect the military’s honor. As a result, it
left open the possibility that the state could
amend its laws to be compatible with the
Convention and then use it against citizens
to protect the military’s honor. To its credit,
however, the Court did create an extremely
high threshold for imposing criminal liability to protect the government’s right to
honor. 		
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